who could not hear at all. Even if shots were fired beside his ear, he would not hear them. Yet he could write, and he understood gestures exceptionally well. He kept a small stone slate in his pocket; whenever he met you, he would gesture, meaning: “Peace be upon you,” then take out the slate and say, “Write”—that is, if you had any news or the like. For this reason, he was among the most knowledgeable of people concerning news; he even knew the news of states and other such matters, because he was keen to receive news.

Thus, the jurists’ statement entails that a deaf person is not eligible to serve as a judge, even if he understands the litigants’ words through gestures or writing. As for gestures, they said: even if he understands through gestures, a litigant may not know how to gesture properly. He may make a gesture which the judge understands to mean something else, since gestures differ. Writing, however, may be in clear, legible letters: the litigant writes, then presents it to the judge, who asks the defendant either to offer a defence or to admit the claim. This is possible. Therefore, if the reason for preventing the appointment of a deaf person as judge is his inability to hear the two litigants, then we say: if the evidence of the two litigants can reach this judge by any means, the underlying reason no longer applies; and when the underlying reason ceases, the ruling ceases.

The eighth condition is his statement: “able to see,” meaning, not blind. A blind person is not fit to serve as a judge. They said: This is because he cannot distinguish the claimant from the defendant. One of them may speak while imitating the other, and he may think that he is the person being imitated, since he distinguishes things only by sound—and sound can be imitated. Thus, the claimant may say, “I have a claim against so-and-so for ten thousand riyals.” The judge then says, “What do you say?” Whereupon the other person imitates the defendant’s voice and says, “Yes,”