The fourth condition is that he be “free”; its opposite is one who is enslaved. He must be fully free. The reasoning is as follows:

First: an enslaved person is generally deemed deficient, because he feels himself inferior to others; thus, he is not found to grasp matters fully, nor is he regarded seriously.

Second: an enslaved person is occupied with serving his master, whereas judicial office requires one to devote oneself to examining and deciding cases between people.

However, there is no evidence in the Quran or the sunnah preventing an enslaved person from being a judge. Therefore, the stronger view is that an enslaved person may validly serve as a judge if he fulfils the conditions of judicial office, namely strength and trustworthiness. If he possesses knowledge, integrity, and honesty, then what prevents him from being a judge?

As for the reasoning that he is occupied with his master’s service, we say: if his master permits him to serve as a judge, then what occupation remains? Indeed, if his master refuses to allow him to be a judge, he has that right. In that case, appointing the enslaved person is precluded—not because he is unfit, but because he belongs to another.

Thus, the correct view is that this quality is not a condition. Enslavement only prevents appointment insofar as the person is occupied with his master’s service. As for the claim that he considers himself inferior to others and the like, this is a rationale, but it is not universally applicable. For among enslaved people are those whom Allah grants knowledge, who then know their standing among people and become muftis, teachers, and beneficial servants of Allah’s creation.

The fifth condition is that he be “a Muslim”; its opposite is a disbeliever, whether from the People of the Book or otherwise. Thus, it is not valid to appoint a non-Muslim