Al-Sharḥ al-MumtiʿIbn al-'Uthaymin

The principle, then, is that when a person is given a choice between two things, or several things, if the purpose of that choice is to make matters easier, then it is a choice based on personal preference and desire. But if the purpose is to serve the greater interest, then it is a choice based on the greater interest. This is founded upon the principle that whoever is given a choice between two matters while acting on behalf of another, his choice must be based on the greater interest, not on personal preference and desire.

His statement, “Whoever is required to offer expiation for an oath”: expiation becomes obligatory when the preceding conditions are fulfilled. According to the author, they are three conditions; and we added a fourth condition: that he be aware.

An example is a man who says, “By Allah, Zayd will certainly arrive tomorrow,” but Zayd does not arrive. According to the madhhab, he must offer expiation; but according to the stronger view, he is not required to offer expiation, because he was reporting what he considered most likely.

If a man says to his brother as they enter a doorway, “By Allah, you must enter,” intending thereby to make an oath, and his brother replies, “I will not enter before you; rather, you enter first,” has the one who swore broken his oath and become liable for expiation?

There is a difference of opinion regarding this issue. The well-known position of the madhhab is that expiation is due from him, because he intended an oath and then broke it.

The second view is that expiation is not due if his intention was to honor the other person, because the honor was achieved through his oath. Thus, his saying, “By Allah, you must enter,” is like saying, “By Allah, I am honoring you.” This is what he intended, for his purpose in having the other enter before him was nothing but to honor him; it is as though he had sworn to provide the honor that was thereby achieved.

They said: On this basis, the incident of Abu Bakr, may Allah be pleased with him, is understood. When he served food to the guests, they said to him, “Eat.” He replied, “By Allah, I will not eat.” They then said to his wife, “Eat,” and she replied, “By Allah, I will not eat.” Then the guests said:

فالقاعدة أنَّه إذا خير الإنسان بين شيئين، أو أشياء، فإن كان المقصود بالتخيير التيسير فالتخيير تشهٍّ وإرادة، وإذا كان المقصود المصلحة فهو تخيير مصلحة، بناءً على قاعدة أن كل من خُيِّر بين شيئين وهو متصرف لغيره، فتخييره مصلحة، وليس تخيير تشهٍّ. قوله: «من لزمته كفارة يمين» تلزم الكفارة إذا تمت الشروط السابقة، وهي ثلاثة شروط على كلام المؤلف، وزدنا شرطاً رابعاً وهو أن يكون عالماً. مثال ذلك: رجل قال: والله ليقدمن زيد غداً، فلم يقدم، فعلى المذهب تلزمه الكفارة، وعلى القول الراجح لا تلزمه؛ لأنه يُخبر عمَّا يغلب على ظنه. ولو قال رجل لأخيه عند دخول الباب: والله لتدخلن، وقصد عقد اليمين، فقال أخوه: لا أدخل قبلك، بل ادخل أنت، فهل يحنث الحالف وتلزمه الكفارة؟ هذه المسألة فيها خلاف، فالمشهور من المذهب أن الكفارة تلزمه؛ لأنه قصد اليمين وحنث في يمينه. والقول الثاني: لا تلزمه إذا كان قصده الإكرام؛ لأن الإكرام حصل بيمينه، فقوله: والله لتدخلن، كقوله: والله إني لأكرمك، فهذا هو المقصود؛ لأنه ليس هدفه من أن يدخل قبله إلا الإكرام، فكأنه حلف على الإكرام الحاصل. قالوا: وعلى هذا تُخَرَّج قصة أبي بكر ﵁، لما قدم الطعام للضيفان، فقال الضيفان له: كل، فقال: والله ما آكل، فقالوا لزوجته: كلي، فقالت: والله ما آكل، فقال الضيفان:

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