“O Prophet, why do you forbid what Allah has made lawful for you, seeking to please your wives? And Allah is All-Forgiving, Most Merciful. Allah has already prescribed for you the expiation of your oaths.” [al-Mujādilah 58:1–2]

If someone were to ask: Do you apply these rulings to the wording of zihār as well? That is, if a man says to his wife, “You are to me like my mother’s back,” do you say that whatever he intended takes effect—divorce, zihār, or an oath—and that if he intended nothing, it is zihār?

The answer is: No. This wording is explicit in zihār. If we were to treat it as divorce, we would be endorsing the ruling of the pre-Islamic era, which is not permissible, because it would alter the legal ruling. Therefore, if you say, “You are to me like my mother’s back,” it is zihār in all circumstances.

If you say: What if he uses it in the manner of an oath, saying, “If I do such-and-such, then my wife is to me like my mother’s back”?

The answer is: Its ruling is that of an oath, unless he intends zihār, because it is apparent here that the purpose is to refrain from doing something.

From this we learn that the stronger view regarding the issue of declaring something forbidden is that there is no difference between one’s wife and anything else.

If a man says to his concubine with whom he has marital relations, “You are forbidden to me,” this is an oath and not zihār, even according to the authoritative school, based on the author’s statement: “Whoever declares lawful things other than his wife forbidden, such as a slave woman, food, or clothing...” Thus, the slave woman is not like the wife; rather, declaring a slave woman forbidden constitutes an oath.

Issue: If the wife says to her husband, “You are forbidden to me,” then, according to the authoritative school, she must make the expiation for an oath. And if she says to her husband, “You are to me like my son’s back or my father’s back,” then, according to the stronger view, she must make the expiation for an oath, and it is not zihār, because