then it would not qualify the preceding statement. For example, if you say, “By Allah, I will certainly wear this garment,” this is unrestricted; but if you then say, “If Allah wills,” it becomes qualified. They therefore say: since we have a qualifier and that which is qualified, the qualifier must be connected to that which it qualifies; otherwise, it is unrelated to it.

The evidence for the third condition—that he must intend the exception before completing that from which the exception is made—is, they say, that if you say, “By Allah, I will certainly wear this garment,” without any intention, then the statement to which, according to your intention, the exception is later added is an unrestricted statement, because you did not intend to introduce a qualification into it. If you subsequently introduce the qualification, that qualification does not abrogate what came before—that is, it does not render qualified a statement that was completed as unrestricted.

The evidence for the fourth condition—that he must intend contingency—is that if he intends affirmation or seeking blessing, he merely intends to reinforce and confirm the matter. The contingency that has an effect is to refer the matter back to Allah’s will. Thus, if you do not intend by it to refer the matter back to His will, but rather intend by mentioning His will to strengthen and confirm the matter, then it has no effect. This is their position: some of it is supported by textual evidence, while some rests on legal reasoning.

The correct view is that nothing is stipulated except utterance. Our evidence is that the angel said to Solomon ﷺ, “Say: ‘If Allah wills,’” after he had completed the sentence; and Solomon had not intended the exception beforehand. The Prophet ﷺ said: “Had he said it, he would not have broken his oath, and he would have attained what he sought.” (1) This is an explicit—indeed, virtually unequivocal—text showing that intention is not stipulated.