Al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ - Ibn al-'Uthaymin - (15/136)

Al-Sharḥ al-MumtiʿIbn al-'Uthaymin

when he is compelled to do it, then according to the madhhab its legal rulings remain in effect.

It has previously been mentioned that the stronger view is that it is not a condition for him to intend to avert the compulsion. Once a person is compelled, his words have no legal effect, due to the general import of the evidences. Moreover, when many ordinary people are compelled, they utter those words intending their actual meaning; not every layman knows that he must intend to avert the compulsion.

For example, a man is compelled to divorce his wife, so he says, “My wife is divorced,” intending to avert the compulsion and not intending to divorce his wife. Another man is compelled to divorce his wife and divorces her, intending the divorce because he has been compelled to do so. In the first case, if he intends to avert the compulsion rather than the occurrence of divorce, his divorce does not take effect, because he did not intend it. In the second case, according to the madhhab, the divorce takes effect because he intended the divorce, even though he was compelled to it.

The correct view is that the divorce does not take effect in either case, due to the general import of the evidences. The issue of an oath is analogous: if someone is compelled to swear that he will not do something, then, if he swears intending to avert the compulsion, he owes no expiation. But if he swears intending the oath itself, while doing so because he was compelled to take it, then according to the madhhab he must offer expiation. The correct view, however, is that he owes no expiation, due to the general import of the evidences and because many ordinary people do not distinguish between averting compulsion and intending the compelled act itself.

Third: breaking his oath—by doing what he swore to refrain from doing, or refraining from what he swore to do—while acting voluntarily and knowingly. If he does it under compulsion or out of forgetfulness, then no expiation is due. Whoever says, in an oath requiring expiation, “If Allah wills,” has not broken his oath, ............

His statement, “Third: breaking his oath”: the basic meaning of ḥinth is sin. Hence Allah’s saying: “And they persisted in the gravest sin.” [al-Wāqiʿah 56:46] That is, the gravest sin. Here, however, it is not a sin, for out of His mercy toward His servants, Allah has granted them a concession to break an oath; otherwise, breaking it would be sinful and unlawful.

حين أكره عليه، فهذا على المذهب أحكامه ثابتة. وسبق أن القول الراجح أنه لا يشترط أن ينوي دفع الإكراه، وأنه إذا أكره فلا حكم لكلامه لعموم الأدلة، ولأن كثيراً من العامة إذا أكرهوا فإنهم يقولون ذلك الشيء بنية ذلك الشيء، وليس كل عامي يعرف أنه لا بد أن ينوي دفع الإكراه. مثاله: رجل أكره على طلاق زوجته، فقال: امرأتي طالق، يريد أن يدفع الإكراه، لا يريد طلاق زوجته، ورجل آخر أُكرِه على طلاق زوجته فطلق يريد الطلاق من أجل أنه أكره عليه، ففي الأولى إذا نوى دفع الإكراه، لا وقوع الطلاق فلا يقع طلاقه؛ لأنه لم يرده، وفي الثانية على المذهب يقع الطلاق؛ لأنه أراد الطلاق وإن كان مكرهاً عليه. والصحيح أنه لا يقع الطلاق في الحالين لعموم الأدلة، ومسألة الحلف مثلها، كما لو أكره على الحلف أن لا يفعل، فإن حلف يريد دفع الإكراه فلا كفارة عليه، وإن حلف يريد اليمين لكن من أجل أنه أكره عليها فعلى المذهب عليه الكفارة والصحيح انه لا كفارة عليه، لعموم الأدلة ولأن كثيراً من العامة لا يفرقون بين دفع الإكراه وحصول المكره عليه. الثَّالِثُ: الحِنْثُ فِي يَمِينِهِ، بِأَنْ يَفْعَلَ مَا حَلَفَ عَلَى تَرْكِهِ، أَوْ يَتْرُكَ مَا حَلَفَ عَلَى فِعْلِهِ مُخْتَاراً ذَاكِراً، فَإِنْ فَعَلَهُ مُكْرَهاً أَوْ نَاسِياً فَلَا كَفَّارَةَ، وَمَنْ قَالَ فِي يَمِينٍ مُكَفَّرَةٍ: إِنْ شَاءَ اللهُ لَمْ يَحْنَثْ، ............ قوله: «الثالث: الحنث في يمينه» أصل الحنث الإثم، ومنه قوله تعالى: ﴿وَكَانُوا يُصِرُّونَ عَلَى الْحِنْثِ الْعَظِيمِ *﴾ [الواقعة]، أي: الإثم العظيم، ولكنه هنا ليس إثماً؛ لأن من رحمة الله ﷿ بعباده أن رخص لهم في انتهاك القَسَم، وإلا فإن انتهاكه إثم وحرام.