the matter was otherwise. For example, a man says, “By Allah, such-and-such happened yesterday,” believing that it did happen, whereas in reality it did not. Thus, he made the oath believing himself to be truthful, but in fact he was not truthful—that is, it became clear that the matter was contrary to what he believed.

Another example: he says, “By Allah, so-and-so attended the lesson last night,” while all the students agree that he did not attend, and in fact he did not attend. There is no expiation for such an oath. The author says that this is an unintentional oath. What it lacks from the conditions is that it be concerning the future, whereas he swore regarding a past matter.

If someone were to ask: Can we call this an unintentional oath when the man intended his oath?

The answer is: This is the view held by the author. However, the correct view is that it is not an unintentional oath; rather, it is a binding oath, but there is no breaking of it. In reality, he has fulfilled his oath and has not broken it, because when he said, “By Allah, he attended,” he believed that he had attended, and he still believes that he attended. Yet, since the witnesses testified that he did not attend, they have more certain knowledge than I do.

Based on this reasoning, if a man swore concerning a future matter that it would happen, based on what he most likely believed, but it did not happen, then according to the established legal school it is a binding oath for which expiation is required when the matter becomes clear to be otherwise, because it concerns the future. Thus, if he says, based on his expectation, “By Allah, Zayd will certainly come tomorrow,” on the assumption that Zayd will come—and Zayd is a truthful man—then tomorrow passes and Zayd does not come, the established legal school holds that he must offer expiation, because this oath