in its pursuit of the quarry, this indicates that it intended to catch it for you; in that case, it is lawful. This is an easy solution.

But if I rebuke it, intending that it should run faster, yet it remains as it was, then it is not lawful, because my rebuke had no effect on it, and it initially set off for its own sake.

Someone may say: Perhaps, due to the extent of its training, this dog has become accustomed to this, and it went only as its owner’s representative. This is possible.

But we say: It is also possible that it merely intended to catch it for itself. When two causes coincide—one permitting and the other prohibiting—the prohibiting side takes precedence.

This is according to the application of this issue to general legal principles. As for the textual evidence, the matter is clear, for he, peace and blessings be upon him, said: “If you release your dog.” So long as it was the dog itself that went off, without my knowledge or instruction, then in reality I did not hunt; rather, it was the dog that hunted.

If I were to appoint it as a general agent and say, “Whenever you see game, you are my agent in releasing yourself,” this would not be valid, because it is not rational and its actions are invalid. As the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said: “An injury caused by an animal is without liability” (1). Since it bears no liability, this indicates that its acts are legally invalid.

If it is asked: What is the ruling on hunting with a solid-black dog? We say: