If his disbelief consists in abandoning the prayer out of negligence and laziness, while he testifies that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, then the two testimonies are not sufficient for him. Rather, he must pray. If he does not, he remains an apostate and is to be treated as apostates are treated.

The essential point is that the principle in this matter is as follows: with the original disbeliever, we are satisfied with the two testimonies—or, more correctly, with the first testimony—and require him to make the second. As for one who was not originally a disbeliever, he must, along with the two testimonies, repent of that which caused him to be judged an apostate, whether it was denying an obligation, denying something whose prohibition is unanimously agreed upon, denying something whose lawfulness is unanimously agreed upon, abandoning the prayer, or the like.

His statement, “Or his saying: ‘I disavow every religion that differs from Islam,’” is a second means of repentance for one whose apostasy resulted from denying an obligation or the like.

In reality, however, this statement is general and ambiguous; it does not indicate that he has truly repented. For he may believe that what he follows is Islam. How many are those who claim to be Muslims and boast of Islam while they are disbelievers: they revile the Companions, believe that Gabriel made a mistake in delivering the Revelation and brought it down to Muhammad—peace and blessings be upon him—when he had been commanded to bring it down to Ali—may Allah be pleased with him—and the like. Thus, if he says, “I disavow every religion that differs from Islam,” should we regard this as a repentance by which the ruling of apostasy is lifted from him, or not? In reality, the author’s statement here is open to an evident objection, for he may have been judged an apostate because of an act which he himself believes to be part of Islam, whereas it is not part of Islam.