and he steals nine hundred thousand, his hand is not amputated, because his share is undivided: divide each dirham into a million parts, and he owns one of them. Since his share is undivided, then no matter how much he steals from the jointly owned property, his hand is not amputated, for he has a share—even if minute—in every part of it.

His statement, “Or if [the property belongs] to someone from whom theft does not entail amputation, he is not amputated”: if a person steals something jointly owned by someone from whom theft does not entail amputation, his hand is not amputated. Thus, if his father has property jointly owned with his paternal uncle, and he steals from the jointly owned property, his hand is not amputated. But if the property belongs exclusively to the uncle, with no joint ownership involved, and he steals from it, his hand is amputated.

His hand is not amputated in the first case because his father has a share in the property. If one steals from property in which someone has a share, and theft from that person would not entail amputation, then his hand is not amputated. The mitigating doubt here is the joint ownership. So long as this property contains a share—even one-millionth—belonging to a person from whose property, if I were to steal, my hand would not be amputated, then my hand is not amputated for stealing from this jointly owned property, as the author states. This is because the property I stole contains a portion for stealing which amputation does not apply—namely, the portion owned by your father. If it contains a portion for which amputation cannot be imposed, then amputation cannot be divided. If the father owned two-fifths and the uncle owned three-fifths, and he stole, should we amputate three fingers? No; it cannot be apportioned in that way.

His statement, “Amputation is not imposed except on the testimony of two upright witnesses”: this is the sixth condition, namely, establishing the theft. There are two means by which it may be established:

First: testimony.