keep it in his possession; rather, he must destroy it. Whoever is able to change it with his hand must destroy it; if he is unable to do so, then with his tongue; and if he is unable to do that, then with his heart.

If someone were to ask, “May I assault the owner of a musical instrument, take it, and break it?”

The answer is that there are details to consider. If you have lawful authority, then yes. But if you have no authority, then do not do so, because this may cause a greater tribulation than its remaining in his possession. You may or may not succeed: he may resist you, and you may be unable to take it. However, if you take it discreetly and secretly, in a manner of which he is unaware, and break it, then that is good. There is no sin upon you, and it entails no tribulation.

His statement, “Nor for something prohibited, such as wine,” means that the hand is not amputated for stealing something prohibited, such as wine, because it is not property in the first place; it has no monetary value whatsoever. This differs from a musical instrument, which does have monetary value, because if it were altered from being a musical instrument, it could be put to use. Wine, however, can never be put to use, for even if it is made into vinegar, that is not permissible—unless it turns into vinegar on its own. Accordingly, if someone steals wine, his hand is not amputated, because it is not property.

But how can someone steal wine without its container?

He could enter a wine shop, for example, carrying a container with him, and fill it with that wine. In that case, his hand is not amputated.

However, if he steals the wine together with its container, then according to the madhhab, his hand is not amputated, though he is liable for the container. This is because the theft includes both something permissible and something prohibited, so the aspect of prohibition—which prevents amputation—takes precedence.