retaliatory retribution, no blood money, and no financial assessment, because it has left no effect. Yet it does entail disciplinary punishment, because it entails neither retaliatory retribution nor blood money.
As for an offense against property, does it entail disciplinary punishment, or is compensation sufficient? We may say that an offense against property involves two rights: a public right and a private right. The private right is addressed through compensation; as for the public right—namely, preventing disorder, corruption, and hostility among people—disciplinary punishment is required. Thus, if the matter reaches the judge and he considers it appropriate to punish the person by requiring compensation for the victim and by imposing disciplinary punishment for the public right, there is nothing wrong with this.
An offense against honor, such as reviling, insulting, and the like, may entail either a prescribed punishment or disciplinary punishment. The case entailing the prescribed punishment is a false accusation of unlawful sexual intercourse; whereas accusations and insults that do not warrant the prescribed punishment entail disciplinary punishment.
His statement, “a woman engaging in sexual acts with another woman,” refers to lesbianism: one woman rubs herself against another until she climaxes, and she may perhaps use something resembling an implement and derive sexual pleasure from the other woman. This does not entail the prescribed punishment, because it is not unlawful sexual intercourse; however, it entails disciplinary punishment for both women.
His statement, “false accusation other than of unlawful sexual intercourse,” means reviling and insulting by means other than accusing someone of unlawful sexual intercourse, such as saying: “You donkey,” “You dog,” “You miser,” or “You ill-mannered person,” and the like. This entails disciplinary punishment, not the prescribed punishment.
If the victim waives his right, it is waived. But once the matter reaches the ruler or judge, the public right remains, in our view. For if we were to leave people in a state of disorder, allowing anyone who wished to revile, insult, or falsely accuse others, and simply leave them unchecked—this would not be appropriate.