return to such conduct. This may be more beneficial for him than if we were to flog him in the marketplace. This is the sound view: disciplinary punishment is not absolutely obligatory; rather, the imam—or whoever holds authority to discipline—may waive it when he considers another measure more beneficial and better.

For every sin for which there is neither a prescribed punishment nor an expiation.

His statement, “for every sin”: if by “sin” he means that which is the opposite of obedience, then this requires consideration, because a person may be disciplined for neglecting acts of obedience. But if he means transgression in the broad sense, encompassing both committing a sin and neglecting an act of obedience, then this is correct. For disciplinary punishment for abandoning an obligatory duty has been established, as in the Prophet’s statement: “Command your children to pray when they are seven years old, and beat them for it when they are ten.” (1)

And the Prophet’s statement: “I was about to order that the prayer be commenced, then command a man to lead the people in prayer,” until he said: “Then I would proceed with men carrying bundles of firewood to people who do not attend the prayer, and burn their houses over them with fire.” (2)

Thus, the correct view is that disciplinary punishment—and this is perhaps what the author intends—is obligatory for every transgression, whether it consists of neglecting an obligatory duty or committing a prohibited act.

But note that disciplinary punishment for committing a prohibited act is not repeated, whereas disciplinary punishment for neglecting an obligatory duty is repeated until the person fulfills that duty. For example, if we tell someone, “Pray before the time expires,” but he is negligent, so we beat him, and then