Al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ - Ibn al-'Uthaymin - (14/304)

Al-Sharḥ al-MumtiʿIbn al-'Uthaymin

if coercion is present, a person—even if he chooses to commit the act—is not punished for it.

Others said that, in order for punishment to be waived, he must intend to avert the coercion rather than intend the act itself. Thus, if a man were compelled to drink wine, such as being told, “Either drink this cup or we will kill you,” and he said, “Since you have compelled me, then bring it,” and drank it by choice, not in order to avert the coercion—would he be subject to the prescribed punishment? This depends on the two views. If we say that he is not required to intend to avert the coercion, then he is not subject to the prescribed punishment, because a person may not have had, prior to that moment, any inward intention to avert the coercion; rather, he simply says, “I have been compelled to do this, so I will do it.” This is the more likely view, since had he not been compelled, he would not have drunk it. But if we say that he must intend to avert the coercion, then he is subject to the prescribed punishment. The correct view is that he is not subject to it.

His statement, “knowing that a large amount of it intoxicates”: this is the third condition. It is required that he know that it is wine and that he know that a large amount of it intoxicates. If he did not know that it was wine—meaning, he thought it was an ordinary beverage—and then became intoxicated after drinking it, he is not subject to the prescribed punishment, because he was unaware of its nature.

Likewise, if he knew that it was intoxicating but did not think that a large amount of it intoxicates, he is not subject to the prescribed punishment, because it is a condition that he know that a large amount of it intoxicates. If he knows that even a small amount intoxicates, then he is subject to the prescribed punishment all the more so.

In addition, the general conditions must be met: he must know that it is prohibited, be an adult, and be of sound mind.

His statement, “then he is subject to the prescribed punishment”: its apparent meaning is that this applies whether he became intoxicated from it or not. Thus, if he knows that a large amount of it intoxicates and drinks it—even if he does not become intoxicated—then he is subject to the

إذا وُجِدَ الإكراه فإن الإنسان ـ وإن اختار الفعل ـ لا يعاقب عليه. ومنهم من قال: يشترط لعدم العقوبة أن ينوي دفع الإكراه، لا ذات الفعل، فلو أن رجلاً أكره على شرب الخمر، كأن قيل له: إما أن تشرب هذه الكأس، وإما أن نقتلك؟ قال: ما دمتم أكرهتموني فهاتوها، فشربها اختياراً لا لدفع الإكراه، فهل يحد؟ ينبني على القولين، إن قلنا: إنه لا يشترط أن ينوي دفع الإكراه فإنه لا يحدُّ؛ لأن الإنسان قد لا يكون في نفسه قبل تلك اللحظة إرادة دفع الإكراه، وإنما يقول: أكرهت على هذا الفعل، فسأفعله، وهذا هو الأقرب، بدليل أنه لولا أنه أكره ما شَرِبَ، وإن قلنا: إنه لا بد أن ينوي دفع الإكراه فإنه يُحَدُّ، والصحيح أنه لا يُحَدُّ. قوله: «عَالماً أَنَّ كَثِيرَهُ يُسْكِرُ» هذا الشرط الثالث، فيشترط أن يعلم أنه خمر، وأن يعلم أن كثيره يسكر، فإن لم يعلم أنه خمر، أي: ظن أنه شراب من سائر المشروبات، ثم لما شربه سَكِر فليس عليه حدٌّ؛ لأنه جاهل بالحال. كذلك لو علم أنه مسكر، لكن لم يظن أن كثيره يسكر، فإنه لا يحد؛ لأنه يشترط أن يعلم أن كثيره يسكر، فإن علم أن قليله يسكر فإنه يحد من باب أولى. ويشترط مع ذلك الشروط العامة، أن يكون عالماً بالتحريم، بالغاً، عاقلاً. قوله: «فعليه الحد» ظاهره أنه سواء سكر منه، أو لم يسكر، فإذا علم أن كثيره يسكر فشرب ـ وإن لم يسكر ـ فعليه