His statement, “committed”: in fact, there is no need for this qualification. Apparently—and Allah knows best—it is an oversight by the author, because the condition of being Muslim makes the condition of being committed to the Islamic legal order unnecessary. For one who is so committed is broader in scope than a Muslim: it includes both the Muslim and the dhimmī, as mentioned previously. Here, however, the dhimmī has been excluded by his statement, “Muslim.” This is why he did not mention it in al-Iqnāʿ, al-Muntahā, or al-Muqniʿ, which is the basis of this book.

His statement, “with whom intercourse is possible”: al-Rawḍ states (1) that this means a boy of ten years and a girl of nine years. Thus, if someone falsely accuses a boy under ten, he is not subject to the prescribed punishment; and if he falsely accuses a girl who has not completed nine years, there is no prescribed punishment, because intercourse is not possible with one like her, and such an accusation does not bring disgrace upon her. This differs from the case discussed there.

His statement, “Puberty is not a condition”: there, however, it says, “while both are adult,” so puberty is a condition there, whereas it is not a condition here.

There, it is also a condition that he must have had intercourse with his wife in a valid marriage, whereas that is not a condition here. Thus, there are conditions applicable there which are not applicable here, and conditions applicable here which are not applicable there.

What the two have in common is freedom and sanity.

The muḥṣan in this context is distinguished by the conditions of Islam and chastity, while the muḥṣan there is distinguished by the requirements that he be adult and that he have had intercourse in a valid marriage.

Thus, each is distinguished by two conditions.