for it, evil and corruption would spread, and every prostitute would bear a child each year, while people would say: “Do not question her; leave her alone until she comes forward and confesses to unlawful intercourse, and only then carry out the prescribed punishment against her.”

As for the jurists’ statement that this falls under doubtful cases, and that prescribed punishments are averted in cases of doubt, we say:

First, we reject the first premise: that this is a doubtful case. Where is the doubt in a woman who has become pregnant? The basic assumption is that she became pregnant only through sexual intercourse. If she has neither a husband nor a master, then we have no explanation other than prohibited intercourse—unless she claims a doubtful circumstance.

Second, the hadith they cite as evidence is weak. Were we to accept every doubt—even one as slight as a spark amid ashes—we would then concur with those who say that if a man hires a woman in order to commit unlawful intercourse with her and does so, then no prescribed punishment is due upon him. This is the view of some scholars, who say: Hiring her creates a doubt concerning the lawfulness of intercourse with her in exchange for payment.

Anyone who wishes to commit unlawful intercourse could reach it through such a method with complete ease. The point is that a mere doubt, even one like a spark amid ashes, is not sufficient and cannot nullify legal rulings; otherwise, people’s affairs would be corrupted.

As for the third view—that the prescribed punishment is to be carried out against her even if she claims a doubtful circumstance—they say that her pregnancy establishes that she committed unlawful intercourse, on the basis of Umar’s hadith. The default assumption is that there was no coercion, so she must produce evidence for the doubtful circumstance she claims; otherwise, the apparent state of affairs must be accepted. This reasoning is stronger