in every revealed law; there is nothing in any law that ever permits fornication. Accordingly, if a dhimmi commits fornication with a woman of his own community who is not Muslim—whether Jewish or Christian—we carry out the prescribed punishment on him, because this punishment has two underlying purposes: to prevent the commission of similar acts and to expiate the sin. If he is not eligible for expiation, the second purpose remains: prevention. This is why the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, carried out the prescribed punishment on the two Jewish people who committed fornication (1), because they considered it forbidden.
But suppose that a particular sin is prohibited in their religion and entails a prescribed punishment in Islam, yet does not entail a prescribed punishment in their own law. Do we carry out the prescribed punishment on them according to Islam, or not?
The answer is: we do not carry out the prescribed punishment on them according to Islam, just as we do not carry it out on them according to Islam for what they consider lawful. If their law does not mandate a prescribed punishment for such a sin, we do not carry it out on them; rather, we subject them to discretionary discipline, because discretionary discipline is obligatory for every sin for which there is neither a prescribed punishment nor expiation.
Fourth: his statement, “aware that it is prohibited,” excludes one who is unaware of its prohibition; no prescribed punishment is due from such a person. But how do we know whether he is ignorant or aware of its prohibition? For if we say that awareness of its prohibition is a condition, everyone would claim that he was unaware of its prohibition, saying, “I did not know that theft was forbidden,” or “I did not know that fornication was forbidden.” In such a case, it must be considered: if he has