lives would be lost. Thus, the general principles support it, for we have lawth—that is, an evident circumstantial indication supporting the claimant’s allegation. There is therefore no distinction between a life and what is less than it.

His statement, “protected,” indicates that a claim concerning the killing of one whose blood is not inviolable is not heard at all. Thus, if one of the belligerent disbelievers claimed that the Muslims had killed his belligerent disbelieving relative, the claim would not be heard. Even if it were established that they had killed him, nothing would be due from them, because he was a belligerent disbeliever whose blood was not inviolable.

Likewise, if his blood were lawful because of apostasy, or because of adultery while being previously married, or because his execution was required as the prescribed punishment for highway robbery, for example, then he is not protected. A claim regarding his killing would therefore not be heard, because even if the killing were established, no compensation would be owed for him. Formulating such a claim and hearing it would thus be futile and serve no purpose.

His statement, “One of its conditions is lawth,” may be unclear to the student. Does it mean that lawth is only part of a condition, since “min” indicates partiality?

The answer is that “condition” is a singular noun in a possessive construction, and thus conveys generality; it is as though he had said: “Among its conditions.”

“And it is manifest enmity, such as tribes that seek vengeance from one another. Thus, whoever is accused of killing without lawth takes a single oath and is acquitted, …”

His statement, “lawth,” is the verbal noun of lātha yalūthu. The author explained it by saying:

“And it is manifest enmity,” meaning between the killer and the slain person, whether it exists between tribes or between individuals. However, the enmity must be manifest. Hidden enmity, by contrast, does not constitute lawth. He then gave an example of this, saying: