because he did not say, “when filing a claim,” nor did he say, “in a killing”; rather, he said, “in a claim.” This is why the oaths fall on the claimant’s side.

His statement, “in a claim of killing,” indicates that the author holds that qasāmah applies neither to a claim of wounding nor to a property claim; rather, it applies only to a claim of killing. Thus, there is no qasāmah in cases involving property or anything less than killing, such as wounds, limbs, and the like.

If, for example, a man claims that his enemy cut off his hand, and the enmity between them is manifest and evident, we do not apply qasāmah in this case, because qasāmah was legislated only in cases of killing. As for limbs, extremities, and wounds, qasāmah does not apply to them. Rather, we say to this claimant: “Do you have evidence?” Otherwise, the defendant either admits the claim or takes an oath, and the matter is concluded.

The reasoning supporting the non-applicability of qasāmah to claims concerning limbs and wounds is that qasāmah is reported only with respect to claims of killing. It departs from the general principles and analogy, and whatever departs from the general principles and analogy cannot itself be made the basis of analogy; one must confine it to what has been reported, because reason has no role in determining it. This is the established position of the school.

Some scholars, however, said that qasāmah is to be applied in claims involving the severing of limbs and wounds. They reasoned that, since qasāmah applies in cases of killing—which are more serious than the severing of a limb or a wound—then its application to what is less serious is all the more appropriate.

Yet qasāmah does not depart from the general principles; rather, the general principles support it. For if we did not implement qasāmah, blood would be lost and violated.