there, and someone falls into it. He has not directly carried out the killing, but he has done something that constitutes a cause of death; therefore, expiation is due from him. This is because one who causes harm indirectly is like the direct perpetrator with respect to liability, and so he must likewise be treated as the direct perpetrator with respect to the obligation of expiation. This is the stronger view.

Some scholars held that no expiation is due from one who causes death indirectly, and that expiation is due only from the direct perpetrator, because the indirect cause is not called a killer. The correct view, however, is that one who causes death indirectly is like the direct perpetrator. Thus, whoever causes a person’s death is liable for expiation.

He says in al-Rawḍ (1): “Or if he shares in killing her.” If he shares in the killing, expiation is due from him. He and his partner are jointly liable for one blood-money payment: the blood-money is one, whereas the expiation is multiple.

Thus, if two people jointly kill someone, they are liable for a single blood-money payment, while each of them must offer an expiation. This occurs frequently: two people collide in their cars, both being at fault, and a man between them dies. They are liable for one blood-money payment and two expiations. If two people die, they are liable for two blood-money payments and four expiations. If one of them asks, “Why should I not offer expiation for one person, while the other offers expiation for the second?” we say: No, because expiation cannot be divided, and each of you participated in killing each of them.

If the reasoning is that expiation cannot be divided, then it may be said that, if the expiation consists of manumission, it can be divided: they may jointly purchase a slave and set him free,