upon the one liable for it, since the choice belongs to him. But if we hold that camels are the basis, then if he presents anything other than camels, the approval of the person entitled to it is indispensable. According to this view, if the offender offers the blood-money as twelve thousand [mithqāls] of silver, and the person entitled to it says, “I want camels,” then the offender is required to provide camels—even if the twelve thousand are equivalent to one hundred camels, or more. However, if the ruler considers it in the public interest to collect blood-money in one particular category of these categories, so as to prevent disputes, he may do so.

His statement, “For intentional killing and شبه عمد (shibh al-ʿamd, quasi-intentional killing), there are twenty-five bint makhāḍ, twenty-five bint labūn, twenty-five ḥiqqah, and twenty-five jadhaʿah”: in his words, “For intentional killing,” one may understand an omitted subject, the implied meaning being: “What is due is twenty-five.”

Alternatively, we may say that “For intentional killing” is a predicate placed before its subject, while “twenty-five” is the delayed subject.

It is understood from his statement, “For intentional killing and quasi-intentional killing,” that intentional and quasi-intentional killing are alike with respect to the ages of the camels.

His statement, “Twenty-five bint makhāḍ”: a bint makhāḍ is a female camel in her second year. It is called this because its mother is generally mākhīḍ (pregnant)—that is, carrying a fetus.