As for when the ruler is among those characterized by justice and mercy—such that, if you say, “I am unable,” he replies, “Then we shall find someone else”—then he bears no liability in this case, because he is like anyone else: he did not compel him.

Thus, if the person issuing the order is an officer in the army or police, and he says to one of the soldiers, “Climb this electricity pole and install the light for us,” and the soldier says, “I cannot,” whereupon the officer says, “Try to climb,” without compelling or beating him, and the soldier then climbs up and falls, the officer is liable. This is because an officer’s orders must be obeyed by soldiers, and disobeying him entails punishment, such as imprisonment, being disciplined before the other soldiers, dismissal, or demotion. In short, this is tantamount to compulsion.

His statement, “just as if a ruler had hired him,” means that if a ruler hired someone to climb a tree or descend into a well, and he perished in doing so, the ruler would not be liable for him. This is clear.

Here, the author analogizes a matter that may appear ambiguous to one that is clear. Thus, he says, “just as if a ruler had hired him.” The reason is that an order differs from a contract of hire: in a contract of hire, consent is plainly present, and there is no one issuing orders and another receiving them. Rather, it is a complete contract between two persons, entered into with the consent of both; neither is commanding the other. The absence of liability in such a case is very evident. Thus, if a ruler hired him to climb a tree or descend into a well, and he perished in doing so, there would be no liability. Likewise, if he merely ordered him. What they have in common is consent and the absence of compulsion in each case. The author therefore analogizes what may seem ambiguous to what is not ambiguous. Among ordinary people, however, a distinction between hiring someone and other cases has become widespread; they say: “If you hire him...”