to kill, liability rests upon the one who gave the order, because he is the cause. Here, the direct perpetrator is not legally accountable and therefore cannot be held liable, since he had no intent; had this person not ordered him, he would not have killed.

These, then, are three cases, although the first and the last partly overlap. For in both cases it may be said that liability cannot be assigned to the direct perpetrator. The difference between them, however, is that in the last case liability is not assigned to the direct perpetrator not because of any deficiency on his part, but because his act is based on a stronger cause. In the first case, by contrast, the direct perpetrator—the predatory beast—cannot be held liable under any circumstances. A person who is not legally accountable, however, such as a child or an insane person, can be held liable, because their intentional acts are treated as mistaken acts. Yet, when the cause is strong and effectively determines their intent, the ruling is assigned to the cause.

In summary, the basis for liability for blood money is either a direct act or causation. The following issues stem from this principle:

First: when two direct perpetrators are involved together, both are liable for the blood money.

Second: when two persons who caused the harm are involved together, both are liable for the blood money.

Third: when a person who caused the harm and a direct perpetrator are involved together, liability rests upon the direct perpetrator, except in three cases:

First: where liability cannot be assigned to the direct perpetrator under any circumstances, because the direct perpetrator is not legally eligible to bear liability, as in the first example.

Second: where the direct act is based on a cause upon which it is legally permissible to act, as in the second example.