for a man. Likewise, if a man were to sever a woman’s hand, his hand would also be severed in return, because a man is killed for a woman.

Thus, in applying this principle, we must refer back to what has preceded. When one person severs another’s hand, we consider whether he would be killed for him if he had killed him. If the answer is yes, we sever his hand in retaliation; otherwise, we do not. The author then mentions another principle, saying:

“Retaliation is due only for that which entails retaliation in cases of homicide.” That is, retaliation for limbs and wounds is due only for that which entails retaliation in cases of homicide. Here, the intended reference is to the offense itself, whereas in the first principle the intended reference was to the offender.

The type of offense that entails retaliation in cases of homicide is intentional, wrongful aggression. Thus, if someone deliberately and wrongfully severs another person’s hand, we apply the preceding principle: if he would be killed for him, we sever his hand; otherwise, we do not. But if he severed his hand by mistake—for example, a person says to another, “Hold this meat for me,” then takes a knife to cut the meat but misses and cuts off one of his fingers—then his finger is not severed, because it was accidental. Just as such an offense does not entail retaliation in cases of homicide, it likewise does not entail retaliation for injuries short of death.

A limb refers to the organs and parts of the body, such as the hand, foot, eye, nose, ear, tooth, penis, and the like.

Wounds are cuts or lacerations in the body, such as when a man wounds another person’s hand, shin, thigh, chest, head, back, or the like.