and he may revert to the blood money. If he says, “I pardon,” without specifying, then the relied-upon view in the madhhab is that he is entitled to the blood money. The second view in the madhhab is that he is entitled to neither retaliation nor blood money, because it is an unrestricted pardon.

The evidence for the relied-upon view is that an unrestricted pardon is construed as referring to the more severe matter, namely retaliation. This may, however, be answered by saying: the implication of an unrestricted pardon is that nothing remains due from the person pardoned. People understand that if someone says, “I have pardoned him,” or “I have forgiven him,” or the like, he means, “I will not demand anything from him”—unless there is an indication that what is intended by the pardon is pardon from retaliation. For example, if he is asked, “Will you kill so-and-so?” and he replies, “No, I have forgiven him,” then perhaps we may say that, when an indication exists showing that pardon from retaliation, rather than an unrestricted pardon, is intended, it is acted upon. But if we consider the wording alone, its plain implication is an unrestricted pardon; thus, he is entitled to neither blood money nor retaliation.

The third case is when the offender perishes—that is, dies. In this case, the blood money becomes fixed, since retaliation is no longer possible. Accordingly, the blood money becomes fixed in four situations:

The first: when he chooses the blood money.

The second: when he pardons retaliation.

The third: when he grants an unrestricted pardon.

The fourth: when the offender perishes.

An example of this is where an offender kills four people, so that four claims to his life are attached to him. If the heirs of the first victim choose retaliation and he is executed, then the blood money becomes fixed for the others. Thus, if a man kills four people, each set of heirs of the slain has a right; however, we begin with the first, then the next.