and delaying the prescribed punishment undoubtedly entails some harm; yet this harm is less serious than the harm of destroying a life without right.

His statement, “Retaliation is not carried out upon her,” meaning, upon the pregnant woman.

His statement, “with respect to a limb,” such as a hand, foot, eye, nose, tongue, and the like: retaliation is not carried out upon a pregnant woman in such cases.

His statement, “until she gives birth,” is because, if retaliation is carried out upon her with respect to a limb, the wound may bleed until she dies, or it may become infected until she dies. She may also suffer fright when her hand, foot, or the like is amputated, causing the pregnancy to be miscarried. For this reason, retaliation is not carried out upon her until she gives birth.

But is retaliation carried out upon her in cases other than limbs—for example, in wounds? Retaliation for wounds, as will come, Allah willing, is established for every wound that reaches the bone, and according to the stronger view, for every wound in which equivalence can be achieved.

The answer is that the apparent meaning of the author’s words, “with respect to a limb,” is that retaliation is carried out upon her for wounds, because wounds are less serious than the loss of a limb. As for mere fright, fright may arise even if she is summoned over a financial claim. If we were to send the police to her and tell them, “Bring so-and-so concerning a financial claim,” she might be frightened. Mere fright, therefore, cannot be made the criterion. Thus, the apparent view is that retaliation is carried out upon her for wounds, unless the wound is large and extensive—for example, if it covers two-thirds of the head. In that case, we may say that it should be deferred.

His statement, “The prescribed punishment in this regard is like retaliation”: there is a prescribed punishment involving destruction