The second is that we know the ruler is unjust; in that case, it is not permissible to carry out his order, for there is no obedience to any created being in disobedience to the Creator.
The third is that the matter is unknown: we do not know whether the person’s blood may lawfully be shed or is inviolable. There is a difference of opinion on this issue. The authoritative view in the school is that it is permissible to carry out the ruler’s order, because the basic presumption regarding a Muslim ruler is that he does not deem the killing of a Muslim lawful except with due cause.
The second view is that it is not permissible unless we know that the person’s blood may lawfully be shed.
His statement, “And if two people participate in it, neither of whom would individually be subject to legal retaliation because of paternity or some other reason, then legal retaliation is due from the accomplice,” means that if two people participate in a killing such that, if either one had acted alone, legal retaliation would not be due from him, then legal retaliation is due from the accomplice, while the other is liable for half the blood-money.
His statement, “because of paternity or some other reason”: an example is where a father and an unrelated person participate in killing the child. The unrelated person is executed in retaliation for the child, whereas the father is not executed for killing his child, as will come, Allah willing, in the chapter on legal retaliation. Thus, in this killing two causes are combined: one establishes legal retaliation, while the other does not establish it. Legal retaliation is therefore due from the accomplice, while the other is not subject to legal retaliation because of the impediment—namely, paternity. As for the unrelated person, there is no impediment in his case, so legal retaliation is carried out against him. Once we carry out legal retaliation against the unrelated person, the father is liable for half the blood-money, because blood-money may be apportioned, whereas legal retaliation may not be apportioned.
His statement, “or some other reason,” includes Islam in the case of killing a disbeliever. Thus, if two people participate