Al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ - Ibn al-'Uthaymin - (14/29)

Al-Sharḥ al-MumtiʿIbn al-'Uthaymin

then, according to the authoritative position of the school, legal retaliation is against the killer, because he was not compelled to kill a specified person. The difference is that one compelled to kill a specified person is bound to kill that very individual, whereas in the other case he was not bound to kill that particular person; rather, he chose to kill one person instead of another.

“And if he orders the killing to be carried out by one who is not legally responsible, or by one who is legally responsible but unaware that it is forbidden, …”

His statement, “And if he orders the killing to be carried out by one who is not legally responsible”: for example, if he says to a child, “Go to that sleeping man and kill him,” and the child does what he was ordered and kills the person, then liability rests upon the one who gave the order. This is because there is an indirect cause and a direct agent, but the direct agent is not legally responsible. The same applies if he orders an insane person to kill someone and the latter kills him: liability rests upon the one who gave the order.

His statement, “or by one who is legally responsible but unaware that it is forbidden,” means that he orders a person who is an adult and of sound mind, but who does not know that killing is forbidden. It does not mean that he is unaware that killing this particular individual is forbidden; rather, he is unaware that killing is prohibited altogether—for instance, a man who has only recently embraced Islam.

An example would be a man who brings a servant from a distant land who knows nothing about Islam. Their car breaks down in the desert, and they are nearly overcome by hunger. They then come upon a fat man, and the man who knows that killing is forbidden says to him, “We are hungry now, and this is a young, fat man whose flesh will be tender. Go and slaughter him so that we may eat him.” The other man, who does not know that killing is forbidden, goes and slaughters him and brings back his limbs. In this case, liability rests upon the one who gave the order, because the direct agent does not know that killing is forbidden and thinks that there is nothing wrong with it.

This is, it seems, extremely far-fetched in our time, but we mention it as a hypothetical case.

فالقصاص هنا ـ على المذهب ـ يكون على القاتل؛ لأنه لم يكرهه على قتل معين، والفرق أن المكرَه في قتل المعين مُلْزَم بهذا الشخص بعينه، أما ذاك فما ألزم بهذا الشخص المعين، فهو الذي اختار أن يقتل فلاناً دون فلان. وَإِنْ أَمَرَ بِالْقَتْلِ غَيْرَ مُكَلَّفٍ أَوْ مُكَلَّفاً يَجْهَلُ تَحْرِيمَهُ، ............. قوله: «وإن أمر بالقتل غير مكلف» لو قال للصغير: اذهب إلى ذلك الرجل النائم واقتله، ففعل ذلك الصغير ما أُمِر به وقتل الشخص، فهنا الضمان على الآمر؛ لأن عندنا متسبباً ومباشراً، والمباشر غير مكلف، ومثله لو أمر مجنوناً بقتل شخص فقتله، فالضمان على الآمر. قوله: «أو مكلفاً يجهل تحريمه» أي: أمر شخصاً بالغاً عاقلاً، لكنه لا يدري أن القتل حرام، وليس المعنى أنه يجهل تحريم القتل بالنسبة إلى هذا المعين، لكنه يجهل تحريم القتل مطلقاً، مثل أن يكون رجلاً أسلم قريباً. مثاله: رجل جاء بخادمٍ من بلدٍ بعيد، لا يدري عن الإسلام شيئاً، وتعطلت عليهم السيارة في الصحراء، وكادا يهلكان من الجوع، فوجدا رجلاً سميناً، فقال له هذا الرجل الذي يعلم تحريم القتل: نحن الآن جُعْنا، وهذا رجل شاب سمين، ولحمه سيكون طرياً، اذهب فاذبحه حتى نأكله، فذهب الآخر الذي لا يعلم تحريم القتل فذبحه وأتى بأعضائه، فهنا الضمان على الآمر؛ لأن المباشر لا يعلم تحريم القتل، ويظن أن القتل لا بأس به. وهذا فيما يظهر في زماننا الآن بعيد جداً لكننا نقوله فرضاً.