Al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ - Ibn al-'Uthaymin - (14/20)

Al-Sharḥ al-MumtiʿIbn al-'Uthaymin

It is understood from his statement, “does something he is permitted to do,” that if he does something he is not permitted to do, by means of an act that normally causes death, it is intentional killing. For example, if he shoots at so-and-so’s sheep but strikes the owner himself, then according to the author’s view, it is intentional killing.

Another example: he intends to shoot ripe dates from a palm tree but strikes the owner of the fruit. According to the apparent meaning of the author’s words, this too is intentional killing.

However, this apparent meaning is open to question. Rather, we say: if he does something he is not permitted to do and strikes a human being, then what he intended to strike is either equal in inviolability to the human being or lesser than him. If it is equal to a human being, then it is undoubtedly intentional killing. An example is where he shoots at a person, thinking him to be a particular person whose blood is inviolable, but strikes someone else. He says, “I did not know that this was so-and-so”—such as if he struck his own brother, meaning the killer’s brother. He would certainly regret it, because he did not intend to kill him; yet he did intend to kill one whose blood was inviolable and who was equal in inviolability to the person killed. Their inviolability is the same. Thus, we say: he intended to kill a Muslim and struck a Muslim, so it is intentional killing, because he intended to violate the sanctity of a believer.

If a man shoots at the ripe dates on a palm tree in order to eat from them and strikes a person, we would say, according to the school: the killing is intentional! But the correct view is that it is not intentional, for there is no doubt that, had this man known that a person whose blood was inviolable was on the palm tree, he would not have killed him. The inviolability of dates is not like the inviolability of a human being. Likewise, if he intended to kill a sheep but killed its owner, then according to the author’s words the killing is intentional. The correct view, however, is that it is not intentional, because the inviolability of a sheep is not like that of a human being.

Thus, the correct formulation is: that a person does something he is permitted to do and thereby strikes a human being, or does something he is not permitted to do and thereby strikes something whose inviolability is lesser than that of a human being.

وعلم من قوله: «أن يفعل ما له فعله» أنه لو فعل ما ليس له فعله بجناية تقتل غالباً فهو عمد، مثال ذلك: أن يرمي شاة فلان فيصيبه هو، فعلى رأي المؤلف يكون عمداً. مثال آخر: أراد أن يرمي الرطب على النخلة فأصاب صاحب الثمرة، فيكون عمداً على ظاهر كلام المؤلف. لكن هذا الظاهر فيه نظر، بل نقول: إذا فعل ما ليس له فعله فأصاب آدمياً، فإما أن يكون ما قصده مساوياً للآدمي أو دونه، فإن كان مساوياً للآدمي فهو عمد بلا شك، مثل أن يرمي شخصاً يظنه فلاناً معصوم الدم، فأصاب شخصاً آخر، وقال: أنا ما علمت أن هذا فلان، كما لو أصاب أخاه ـ أي: أخا القاتل ـ فإنه سيندم؛ لأنه لم يُرِد قتله، لكنه أراد قتل معصوم مساوٍ للمقتول، فالحرمة واحدة، فنقول: هذا أراد قتل مسلم فأصاب مسلماً، فهو قتل عمد؛ لأنه أراد هتك حرمة المؤمن. ولو أن رجلاً رمى الرطب على النخلة ليأكل منها فأصاب إنساناً نقول: القتل عمد على المذهب! لكن الصحيح أنه ليس بعمد؛ لأنه لا شك أن هذا الرجل لو علم أن على النخلة شخصاً معصوماً لم يقتله، وحرمة التمر ليست كحرمة الآدمي، ولو أراد قتل شاة فقتل صاحبها فالقتل على كلام المؤلف عمد، والصواب أنه ليس بعمد؛ لأن حرمة الشاة ليست كحرمة الآدمي. فالصواب أن يقال: أن يفعل ما له فعله فيصيب آدمياً، أو يفعل ما ليس له فعله فيصيب من حرمته دون حرمة الآدمي.