But if they testify to something that merely permits his execution, rather than requiring it, then this is not deliberate killing, because he can escape its consequence. An example is if they testify that he apostatized in a case where repentance is accepted, since the person testified against can avoid execution by returning to Islam.

Another example: they testify that he denied the obligatory nature of the prayer. This is apostasy that permits execution but does not require it, for he may say, “I repent to Allah, and I affirm sincerely that the five daily prayers are obligatory.” In that case, execution is waived from him.

His statement, “And the like of that”: the demonstrative expression “that” refers to what has preceded—that is, cases resembling these. The matter is not restricted to these examples; rather, we must refer back to the governing criterion and say regarding deliberate killing: “It is when a person intends to kill one whom he knows to be a legally protected human being, using something that is more likely than not to cause death.”

His statement, “Quasi-deliberate killing is when one intends an assault that does not usually kill”: deliberate killing and quasi-deliberate killing both involve death, but they differ in that, in deliberate killing, the assault normally causes death, whereas in quasi-deliberate killing it does not normally cause death. However, the author stipulated a condition, saying:

“And he does not wound him with it.” He qualified it with this condition because, if he wounds him with it, then even if it does not normally kill, it becomes deliberate killing. An example is the author’s statement:

“Such as one who strikes him on a nonfatal part of the body with a whip or a small stick,” for