to assign liability to the direct perpetrator, liability rests upon the one who caused it. Here, however, it is impossible to assign liability to the direct perpetrator—the lion—so liability rests upon the one who caused it.

Al-Rawd (1) states: “Or [he throws him in] bound in the lion’s presence,” meaning, in the presence of the lion. By “bound” is meant that his hands are tied to his shoulders. In this case, it is deliberate killing. They mention the story of Jaḥdar ibn Mālik, when al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf al-Thaqafī seized him over an alleged offense—he claimed it was an offense—and said to him: “I will not kill you, but I shall bring a lion, deprive it of food for fifteen days, give you a sword, and shackle your other hand.” So he starved the lion for fifteen days, then released it and released Jaḥdar ibn Mālik. The lion sprang upon Jaḥdar out of intense hunger, but as it lunged at him, Jaḥdar raised the sword and drove it into its throat. The lion died, while Jaḥdar did not. This is mentioned in the marginal notes to Mughni al-Labīb. The story is lengthy, but the point is that if he throws him, bound, into the lion’s presence, it is deliberate killing.

But if he were to do something like what happened in Jaḥdar’s story, would it count as deliberate killing, even though he gave him a sword? In truth, had he not been strong, courageous, and physically robust, he would not have been able to overcome a lion that had been starved for fifteen days and then released.

The fourth case is his statement: “Or [he throws him] into a fire or water in which he will drown and from which he cannot escape.” If he is thrown into a fire or water from which he is able to escape, then his death goes uncompensated, and it is not deliberate killing.