constitute the criterion for deliberate killing, so that the cases mentioned by the author may be assessed accordingly. For among the cases he mentions are some that do not conform to this rule, and these must therefore be examined individually. The author then mentions nine cases, saying:

“Such as wounding him with something that penetrates the body.” This is the first case: “that he wounds him.” The subject is the killer, or offender, and the object is the victim; that is, such as when the offender wounds the victim.

“Such as wounding him with something that penetrates the body, or striking him with a large stone or the like, ...”

His words, “with something that penetrates”: this is explained in al-Rawḍ (1) as meaning, “something that enters the body.” For example, if he pricks him with the head of a pin, this penetrates the body, and according to the author it constitutes deliberate killing. Yet, according to the rule, it does not qualify as deliberate killing, because the rule is: “that he kills him with something from which death is likely, in all probability, to result.” Death is not likely, in all probability, to result from this—unless, that is, he pricks him in a fatal spot, such as the heart, a vein, or the like. But if he pricks him in an extremity of the body, then this is not, in reality, deliberate killing. How many wounds affect the leg from a nail, a piece of glass, or the like, yet people do not say that this kills.

If someone were to say: “It does not kill directly, but it becomes infected and deteriorates little by little until it kills him,” what should we say? We say: what matters is the original cause. Here, he did not die from the wound itself; rather, he died from poisoning and the wound’s deterioration. So, if he wounds him with something that penetrates the body, and the victim is told, “Treat the wound so that the blood does not continue to flow,” but the victim says, “No; rather, I shall let it continue to flow until the man is killed,”