His statement, “If the impediment ceases, his right is restored,” means that if a slave becomes free, his right is restored; if a disbeliever embraces Islam, his right is restored; if an openly sinful person becomes upright, his right is restored; and if a married woman is divorced, her right is restored. According to the madhhab, her right is restored. Strangely, they say that her right is restored even if the divorce is revocable, although a woman in a revocable divorce remains legally in the position of a wife. What difference, then, is there between a woman whose marriage contract has been concluded and who stipulates that her husband is not to consummate the marriage until the custody period has ended, and a woman whom her husband divorces with a revocable divorce?! Thus, if a woman stipulates that her husband is not to consummate the marriage until the custody period has ended, the view that her right is not forfeited is very strong, because a ruling revolves with its effective cause.

His statement, “If either of the parents wishes to undertake a long journey to a distant town in order to settle there, and both he and the route are safe, then custody belongs to the father”: in their view, a long journey is one that reaches the distance allowing the shortening of prayer. According to the madhhab, this is fixed at sixteen farsakhs—that is, four buruds—equivalent to eighty-one kilometres and three hundred-odd metres.

His statement, “a long journey,” is apparently unrestricted. However, it must be qualified as being without the intention of harming the other parent, for one may travel merely to take the child from the other parent in order to harm them, rather than for the child’s welfare. It should therefore be restricted by the absence of harmful intent, as Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah and his student Ibn al-Qayyim—may Allah have mercy on them both—qualified it.