for him and becomes accustomed to him; and he has been commanded to treat her with filial kindness. If she does not nurse him, this will not be attained.

His statement, “He must not prevent his mother from nursing him,” should not be understood without qualification. Rather, if the mother has an illness that is feared may be transmitted to the child, then in this case he must prevent her from nursing him—for example, if she has sores on her breasts such that the child would be harmed were he to nurse from them. Likewise, if she develops a contagious illness such as tuberculosis or the like, he must prevent her from nursing him.

His statement, “She is not obliged to do so except in a case of necessity, such as fear that he may perish,” means that the mother is not obliged to nurse the child except in a case of necessity.

The apparent meaning of the author’s words is that necessity is confined to the fear of death; as for fear of harm, it is not deemed a necessity. The correct view, however, is that necessity is not confined to fear of death; rather, it includes either fear of death or fear of harm.

An example of fear of death is where no wet nurse can be found, or one is found but the child refuses her breast.

An example of fear of harm is where a wet nurse is found and the child accepts her, but her milk is scant: the child survives on it, yet it is insufficient for him. In this case, the mother is obliged to nurse him.

The apparent meaning of the author’s words is that she is not obliged to do so whether she remains married to the husband or has been irrevocably divorced from him.

Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah said: Rather, if she remains married to the husband, she is obliged to nurse him. What the Shaykh said is sounder, unless she and the father mutually agree for another woman to nurse him, in which case there is no harm. But if the husband says, “No one but you is to nurse him,” then she is obliged to do so, even if we find someone who