need that permits it; rather, it is only a need comparable to the case of Salim. But a need comparable to Salim’s case is no longer possible, because adoption has been abolished. Once that circumstance ceased, the ruling likewise ceased.

Supporting this explanation is the fact that when the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said, “Beware of entering upon women,” they asked, “O Messenger of Allah, what about the husband’s male relative”—such as his brother, for example? He replied, “The husband’s male relative is death.” (1) Such a relative may need to enter his brother’s home when they share a household, yet the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, did not say, “Let his brother’s wife nurse him,” even though this need was mentioned to him. This proves that a mere need does not permit an adult to be nursed. For, if we were to say so, it would entail tremendous harm: a woman could give her husband milk from her breast every day, and once the fifth day came, he would become her son. This is problematic. Thus, this view is weak both in terms of textual evidence and rational consideration, and it is not sound.

As for the claim of abrogation, it is invalid, because one of the conditions for establishing abrogation is knowing the chronology, and here we do not know it. If we were to claim abrogation, our opponents could likewise claim that we have been abrogated, saying that the hadiths indicating that nursing is effective only within the first two years have been abrogated by the hadith of Salim. Our claim against them is no stronger than theirs against us.

In summary, after the abolition of adoption, we say that nursing an adult is not permissible, nor does it have any legal effect. Rather, nursing must either take place within the first two years or before weaning; the latter is the stronger view.