her husband is missing, waits the period indicated by the author; then, after that, she observes the waiting period for death and may then marry.

His statement, “She does not require a judge’s ruling”: in the terminology of the jurists, the ḥākim means the judge, not the ruler. What the author has mentioned here is one of the distinctive positions of the school of Imam Ahmad.

The second view on this issue is that a judge’s ruling is necessary, lest people fall into disorder. For if we were to say that every woman whose husband goes missing should wait for the period after which she considers it most likely that he has died, and then remarry, this would lead to disorder. A woman whose husband has been away from her for a long time, and who desires another husband, might say, “My husband is missing,” and proceed in this manner.

For this reason, the second view in the school—and the position of the three imams—is that she must refer the matter to the judge, who is responsible for it. This is necessary, particularly according to the stronger view: namely, that the ruling of his death is referred to the judge’s independent assessment. We may, however, say that the waiting period for death does not require a judge’s ruling. Once the judge has set the period of waiting, it necessarily follows that, when it ends, she begins the waiting period for death; there is no need for the judge to issue a further ruling.

His statement, “And if she marries”: that is, the wife of the missing man. By saying, “if she marries,” the author indicates that she may marry, because once the prescribed period and the waiting period have ended, separation has taken place and she becomes lawful for marriage. But is she the second husband’s wife outwardly only, or both outwardly and in reality? The correct view is that she is his wife both outwardly and in reality, for when legal rulings are established, they are established both outwardly and in reality. Accordingly, she may