Al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ - Ibn al-'Uthaymin - (13/354)

“Then it is only the waiting period for divorce,” meaning that she does not transfer to another waiting period.

But if he makes the divorce contingent upon an act she cannot avoid—for example, if he says, “If you go to the bathhouse, you are divorced,” and she goes during his terminal illness from which death is feared—then in this case she is divorced, but she inherits and observes whichever is longer: the waiting period for death or that for divorce.

Accordingly, if a man dies after having divorced a woman who is still in her waiting period from him, there are three scenarios:

First: if the divorce is revocable, she transfers to the waiting period for death.

Second: if the divorce is irrevocable and she does not inherit, she completes the waiting period for divorce.

Third: if the divorce is irrevocable but she inherits, she observes whichever is longer: the waiting period for death or that for divorce. This is the view adopted by the author.

The second view is that she completes the waiting period for divorce, because no marital bond remains between them. The evidence for this is that, if she were to die, he would not inherit from her; she is irrevocably divorced from him, so it is not permissible for him to be alone with her, to travel with her, or for her to uncover her face before him. We only allow her to inherit from him in order to treat him contrary to his intention. Thus, the effective cause here does not arise from the marital relationship, but from treating a person contrary to his intention.

This view is very strong indeed. What could exclude her from the general ruling? The issue of inheritance is distinct from the issue of the waiting period. That is why she inherits from him even if her waiting period has ended, so long as he is suspected of intending to deprive her of inheritance. This shows that the waiting period has no connection to the subject of inheritance. Upon reflection, this view is stronger than the one followed by the author, because the basic presumption is that what already exists remains as it is.

«فلطلاقٍ لا غير» يعني لا تنتقل. أما إن علقه على فعل لا بد لها منه، مثل أن يقول: إن ذهبت إلى الحمام فأنت طالق، فذهبت في مرض موته المخوف، ففي هذه الحال تطلق، ولكن ترث وتعتد الأطول من عدة وفاة وطلاق، وعلى هذا فنقول: إذا مات الرجل وقد طلق امرأة وهي في عدة منه، فلها ثلاث حالات: الأولى: إن كانت رجعية انتقلت إلى عدة الوفاة. الثانية: إن كانت بائناً لا ترث أكملت عدة الطلاق. الثالثة: إن كانت بائناً ترث اعتدت الأطول من عدة وفاة وطلاق هذا ما ذهب إليه المؤلف. والقول الثاني: أنها تكمل عدة الطلاق؛ لأنه لا علاقة بينه وبينها، بدليل أنه لا يرث منها لو ماتت، وأنها بائنة منه لا يجوز أن يخلو بها، ولا أن يسافر بها، ولا أن تكشف له وجهها، وإنما ورّثناها منه معاملةً له بنقيض قصده، فهنا العلة ليست من قبل الزوجية، ولكن من قبل معاملة الإنسان بنقيض قصده، وهذا القول قوي جداً؛ لأنه ما الذي يخرجها عن العموم؟! ومسألة الإرث غير مسألة العدة، ولذلك ترث منه ولو تمت العدة ما دام متهماً بقصد حرمانها، فدل ذلك على أنه لا علاقة للعدة بباب الميراث، وهذا القول عندما تتأمله تجده أرجح من القول الذي مشى عليه المؤلف؛ لأن الأصل بقاء ما كان على ما كان.