menstruation ordinarily comes to a nursing woman, so she must wait until her menstruation returns and then menstruate three times. In this case, the longer period is unquestionably the waiting period for divorce.
But should we say that she must observe mourning, or that she need not observe mourning because mourning is ancillary to the waiting period, and her waiting period now is that of divorce rather than death? This requires consideration. The apparent view is that mourning is one of the rulings ancillary to the waiting period: if we require her to observe the waiting period for divorce, then she need not observe mourning; but if we require her to observe the waiting period for death, then she must observe mourning.
Another example: if this divorced woman is pregnant, then her waiting period ends upon delivery in all cases, because the waiting period of a pregnant woman ends with delivery, whether the separation resulted from divorce or death. Thus, if he irrevocably divorces her while she is pregnant, we do not say that she transfers to another waiting period; rather, her waiting period ends upon delivery.
“Unless she is a slave woman, a dhimmi woman, or the separation resulted from her; then it is only the waiting period for divorce. And if he divorces some of his wives without specifying which one, or specifies one and then forgets which one, and then dies before lots are cast, each of them—except a pregnant woman—must observe the longer of the two periods, ……”
His statement, “unless she is a slave woman or a dhimmi woman”: the author excluded the slave woman and the dhimmi woman, because a slave woman does not inherit. Thus, if he divorces her during the terminal illness from which death is feared, he is not suspected of intending to deprive her of inheritance. Likewise, if her husband is Muslim, a dhimmi woman does not inherit because of the difference in religion.
His statement, “or the separation resulted from her”: an example is when he makes her divorce contingent upon an act that she could have avoided, such as saying, “If you leave the house, you are divorced,” intending divorce, and she leaves during the terminal illness from which death is feared. In this case, she does not inherit, because he is not suspected of intending to deprive her of inheritance. Accordingly, she does not transfer to another waiting period; rather, she remains upon the waiting period for divorce, because the separation resulted from her. This is why he said: