Al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ - Ibn al-'Uthaymin - (13/251)

Al-Sharḥ al-MumtiʿIbn al-'Uthaymin

the implication of his saying, “You are to me like my mother’s back,” is that she becomes forbidden to him and unlawful for him. Thus, if he retains her for a period in which he could divorce her but does not do so, it is known that he has accepted this wife and has returned.

This too is incorrect, because not divorcing her in this situation does not indicate a return. Moreover, it entails that the wording of ẓihār constitutes a divorce, since this brief interval—this short period of time—would mean that it is exactly like a divorce.

The fourth opinion is that the return is the resolve to have intercourse; that is, he resolves to have intercourse with his wife. Thus, Allah’s saying, “then they go back on what they have said,” means that they resolve to regard the woman as lawful, on condition that he has intercourse with her. But if he resolves to regard her as lawful, yet does not have intercourse with her and then, for example, divorces her, no expiation is due from him, because it becomes obligatory only through intercourse.

This view is correct. Accordingly, if a man says to his wife, “You are to me like my mother’s back,” and then resolves to regard her as lawful, we say: this is a return to permissibility after prohibition. Yet the expiation does not become obligatory except through intercourse. The school of jurisprudence, however, holds—as the author stated—that the return is intercourse itself. But the apparent meaning of the noble verse is contrary to this, for Allah, Most High, says, “before they touch one another.” How, then, can we interpret the return as sexual contact? If we say that the return is intercourse, the meaning of the verse would become: then they have intercourse with them, so the freeing of a slave is required before they touch one another. This is incoherent. Rather, the return is the resolve to have intercourse and to regard her as lawful in a manner that would not apply to one’s mother. However, the expiation does not become binding as a liability except through intercourse.

His statement, “and it must be discharged,” means: the expiation must be discharged.

His statement, “before it,” means: before intercourse.

إن مقتضى قوله: أنت عليّ كظهر أمي أن تكون حراماً عليه، لا تحل له، فإذا أمسك زمناً يمكنه أن يطلق فيه ولم يفعل علم أنه قد ارتضى هذه الزوجة، وأنه قد عاد. وهذا ـ أيضاً ـ ليس بصحيح؛ وذلك لأن عدم طلاقها في هذه الحال لا يدل على العود، وهذا يقتضي أن يكون لفظ الظهار طلاقاً؛ لأن هذه البرهة ـ الزمن القصير ـ معناه أنه كالطلاق تماماً. القول الرابع: أن العود هو العزم على الوطء، يعني يعزم على أن يطأ زوجته، فقوله تعالى: ﴿ثُمَّ يَعُودُونَ لِمَا قَالُوا﴾ أي: يعزمون على استحلال المرأة، بشرط أن يطأها؛ أما إذا عزم على استحلالها ولكن ما وطئ ثم طلق مثلاً؛ فإنه ليس عليه كفارة؛ لأنها ما تجب إلا بالوطء. وهذا القول هو الصحيح، وعلى هذا فإذا قال الرجل لامرأته: أنت علي كظهر أمي، ثم عزم على استحلالها، نقول: هذا عود إلى الحل بعد التحريم، لكن لا تجب الكفارة إلا بالوطء، أما المذهب فكما قال المؤلف: إن العود هو نفس الوطء؛ لكن ظاهر الآية الكريمة خلاف ذلك؛ لأن الله تعالى يقول: ﴿مِنْ قَبْلِ أَنْ يَتَمَآسَّا﴾ فكيف نفسر العود بالمسيس، فإذا قلنا: إن العود هو الوطء صار معنى الآية: ثم يمسوهن فتحرير رقبة من قبل أن يتماسَّا، وهذا لا يستقيم، ولكن العود هو العزم على الوطء، واستحلالها استحلالاً لا يكون للأم، إلا أن الكفارة لا تثبت في الذمة إلا بالوطء. قوله: «ويلزم إخراجها» أي: إخراج الكفارة. قوله: «قبله» أي: قبل الوطء.