Allah, Exalted is He, says, “before they touch one another.” Accordingly, he may kiss her, embrace her, be alone with her, and repeatedly look at her—unless he fears that he cannot control himself. In that case, he is given a specific ruling prohibiting such conduct; otherwise, the basic ruling is permissibility. This view is more correct, because Allah, Exalted is He, prohibited touching, meaning intercourse, and by implication permitted everything besides it. However, if a man knows of himself—because of the strength of his desire—that engaging in these preliminaries will lead him to have intercourse, then we prevent him from doing so. Its counterpart is the fasting person: intercourse is forbidden to him, while intimate contact is permitted. Likewise, intercourse with a menstruating woman is forbidden, while intimate contact with her is permitted. The point is that there is no evidence that whenever intercourse is prohibited under a religious ruling, its preliminaries are likewise prohibited.

“An expiation does not become binding as a liability except through intercourse, which is the return. It must be discharged before intercourse when one resolves to do so. One expiation is due if he repeats it before offering the expiation with respect to one wife, and if he pronounces ẓihār against his wives in a single statement. But if he pronounces ẓihār against them in separate statements, then multiple expiations are due.”

His statement, “An expiation does not become binding as a liability except through intercourse,” means that intercourse is a condition for its becoming obligatory. As for ẓihār, it is the cause; and when a cause is subject to a condition, its ruling is not established until that condition exists. Zakah provides an example: possession of the minimum taxable amount is the cause for its obligation, while completion of a full lunar year is the condition for its obligation. If the wealth is destroyed before the year is complete, then no zakah is due on it.

Similarly, if a man pronounces ẓihār against his wife and then divorces her, is the expiation due from him? The expiation is not due from him, because the condition for its obligation—namely, intercourse—has not occurred. This is why the author said, “An expiation does not become binding as a liability except through intercourse.” Thus, if the man dies before having intercourse, or the woman dies before he has intercourse with her, or he separates from her before having intercourse with her, the expiation is not due.

If someone were to ask: Has not the cause, namely ẓihār, occurred? We reply: Yes, but this cause is conditional: intercourse is required for the expiation to become obligatory. Yet intercourse is not permissible until the expiation has been discharged. Discharging it is therefore a condition for the permissibility of intercourse, not a condition for its becoming binding as a liability. This is why the author said, “It does not become binding as a liability except through intercourse.”