Al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ - Ibn al-'Uthaymin - (13/243)

Al-Sharḥ al-MumtiʿIbn al-'Uthaymin

but there is lawful blood: the liver and the spleen. Thus, if he says, “I intended the lawful kind,” his statement is accepted as binding upon him before Allah, because this is contrary to the apparent meaning; and whatever is contrary to the apparent meaning is not accepted judicially.

His words, “then he has pronounced ẓihār”: We have previously mentioned, in the author’s discussion, that if by his statement, “like blood, a carcass, or a pig,” he intends divorce, then it is a divorce; and if he intends an oath, then it is an oath. What the author says here does not contradict what he said previously. His words here are to be understood as applying when he intends ẓihār or has no particular intention. But if he intends an oath, it is an oath; and if he intends divorce, it is a divorce.

His words, “But if she says it to her husband, it is not ẓihār”: That is, if a woman says to her husband, “You are to me like my father’s back,” has she pronounced ẓihār? No. For Allah says: “Those among you who pronounce ẓihār upon their wives” [al-Mujādilah 58:2], and He says: “Those who pronounce ẓihār upon their wives” [al-Mujādilah 58:3]. He did not say, “those who pronounce ẓihār upon their husbands.” Thus, He assigned ẓihār to men. Just as she cannot divorce herself, neither can she pronounce ẓihār upon her husband.

His words, “yet she must offer its expiation”: That is, she must offer the expiation for ẓihār. This is one of the peculiar issues in which it is said, “It is not ẓihār, yet she must offer its expiation!” This is among the remarkable oddities of legal knowledge: that a thing is negated while its effects are still entailed. For if we say that it is not ẓihār, the necessary conclusion is that she should not be liable for the expiation of ẓihār. Can an effect exist without its cause? How, then, can we require a woman to offer the expiation for ẓihār while saying that it is not ẓihār? This is a contradiction.

An example is that she says to her husband, “You are to me like my father’s back.” Then her husband comes to her at night and asks to have intercourse with her. We say: “Yes, she must allow him to”

يوجد دم حلال، وهو الكبد والطحال، فإذا قال: أنا نويت الحلال دُيِّنَ؛ لأن هذا خلاف الظاهر، وما كان خلاف الظاهر فإنه لا يقبل منه حكماً. قوله: «فهو مظاهر» لكن سبق لنا في كلام المؤلف أنه إذا نوى بقوله: كالدم، والميتة، والخنزير الطلاق فهو طلاق، وإن نوى اليمين فهو يمين، وكلام المؤلف هنا لا يعارض كلامه فيما سبق، فيحمل كلامه هنا على ما إذا نوى الظهار، أو لم ينوِ شيئاً، أما إذا نوى اليمين فهو يمين، وإذا نوى الطلاق فهو طلاق. قوله: «وإن قالته لزوجها فليس بظهار» أي: قالت المرأة لزوجها: أنت عليَّ كظهر أبي فهل تكون مظاهرة؟ لا؛ لأن الله قال: ﴿الَّذِينَ يُظَاهِرُونَ مِنْكُمْ مِنْ نِسَائِهِمْ﴾ [المجادلة: ٢]، وقال: ﴿وَالَّذِينَ يُظَاهِرُونَ مِنْ نِسَائِهِمْ﴾ [المجادلة: ٣] ولم يقل: يظاهرون من أزواجهن، فجعل الظهار للرجل، فكما أنها لا تطلق نفسها، فلا تظاهر من زوجها. قوله: «وعليها كفارته» أي: عليها كفارة الظهار، وهذه من المسائل الغريبة أن يقال: ليس بظهار وعليها كفارته! فهذا شيء من عجائب العلم أن يُنفى الشيء، وتترتب آثاره؛ لأن الواجب إذا قلنا: ليس بظهار، أن لا يلزمها كفارة ظهار، وهل يمكن أن يوجد الأثر دون المؤثر؟! فكيف نوجب على المرأة كفارة الظهار ونحن نقول: إنه ليس بظهار؟! فهذا تناقض. مثال ذلك: قالت لزوجها: أنت علي كظهر أبي، فجاء زوجها في الليل، وطلب منها أن يجامعها، نقول: نعم، تمكنه من