understood as either a condition or an oath. If he intends thereby to prevent her, then it is an oath; but if he intends that divorce should take effect upon her speaking to Zayd, then it is a condition by which divorce takes effect.

This statement of the jurists—may Allah the Exalted have mercy on them—clearly indicates that what Shaykh al-Islam chose, namely that a divorce made contingent upon something is sometimes intended as an oath and therefore takes the ruling of an oath, is correct.

According to the madhhab, if he says, “If I swear an oath involving your divorce, then you are divorced,” and then says, “You are divorced if you stand,” she is divorced; and if she stands, she is divorced a second time. This is because the preceding division concerning divorce made contingent upon conditions was based on the stronger view, not on the madhhab. The madhhab regards every divorce made contingent upon conditions as a pure condition through which divorce takes effect. This clearly demonstrates that the view adopted by Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah is the truth, because they acknowledged the distinction between an oath and a condition.

His statement: “If I swear an oath involving your divorce, then you are divorced,” or, “If I speak to you, then you are divorced,” and he repeats it once more, she is divorced once.” The author of al-Rawd (1) said: “Because repeating it constitutes both an oath and speech.” Thus, if he says, “If I swear an oath involving your divorce, then you are divorced,” and then says, “If I swear an oath involving your divorce, then you are divorced,” she is divorced, because that upon which the divorce was made contingent has occurred.

Likewise, if he says, “If I speak to you, then you are divorced,” and then says, “If I speak to you…”