His statement, “even if they are not in sequence”: whether sitting precedes standing or standing precedes sitting.

His statement, “and with aw, upon the occurrence of either one”: “If you stand or sit, then you are divorced.” She is divorced upon the occurrence of either one, because aw denotes one of two things.

In al-Rawḍ ⦗1⦘, he mentions a singular case, stating: “If he makes divorce contingent upon descriptions which are combined in a single entity—for example: ‘If you see a man, then you are divorced’; ‘if you see a black man, then you are divorced’; and ‘if you see a jurist, then you are divorced’—and she sees a man who is black and a jurist, she is divorced three times.” This is because it is true of her that she saw a man, that she saw a black man, and that she saw a jurist. Thus, she is divorced because the three descriptions are combined in one entity, giving precedence to the description.

It was also said that she is not divorced, because oaths are referred back to customary usage. Customary usage dictates that, if a person says, “If you see a man,” “if you see a black man,” and “if you see a jurist,” this entails a plurality of persons. Thus, if there is evidence that he intended plurality, it is acted upon. This is the correct view.