sits, as though he had said, “If you sit after standing, then you are divorced.” Thus, she is not divorced until she stands and then sits.

The fourth: he says, “You are divorced if you sit, if you stand.” Similarly, she is not divorced until she stands and then sits.

As for the first two cases, the sequence in them is evident, for in the first he says, “If you stand and then sit,” and in the second, “If you stand, then sit.”

As for the latter two cases, the sequence in them follows from the rule that, when one condition is embedded within another, the condition mentioned later is earlier in time. This is because one condition is made contingent upon another, and that upon which something is made contingent must necessarily precede the contingent matter. Thus, in the statement, “If you stand, if you sit,” the sitting—which comes later in wording—comes first in time. As the poet said:

“If you call upon us for help when you are alarmed,
You will find in us strongholds of might adorned by generosity.”

Seeking help comes after alarm. Therefore, when one condition occurs within another, that which is mentioned later comes first in time. So, if he says, “If you stand, if you sit,” sitting comes before standing; and likewise, “If you stand, when you sit”: sitting comes before standing. Similarly, if he says, “If you eat, if you drink, then you are divorced,” drinking precedes eating.

If it is asked: Is it not possible that his statement, “If you eat, if you drink,” is understood as coordination—meaning, “If you eat and if you drink, then you are divorced”? We reply: Yes, both eating and drinking must occur; but which of them comes first? The one mentioned later—namely, drinking—comes first.

“And with wāw, she is divorced upon the occurrence of both, even if they are not in sequence; and with aw, upon the occurrence of either one.”

His statement, “And with wāw, she is divorced upon the occurrence of both”: if he says, “You are divorced if you stand and sit,” she is divorced upon the occurrence of both.