or the like is that this is an oath, and the wife is not divorced; rather, he must offer expiation for an oath.

His statement, “or the like of these two”: (1)

“If you are divorced today when tomorrow comes,” is meaningless. If he says, “You are divorced in this month,” or, “today,” she is divorced immediately. If he says, “tomorrow,” “on Saturday,” or “in Ramadan,” she is divorced at its beginning. If he says, “I intended the end of each of them,” his statement is accepted judicially and he is held to it in his religious obligation, …

His statement, “If you are divorced today when tomorrow comes, [it] is meaningless”: This is because tomorrow cannot come today. Thus, he has made the divorce contingent upon something impossible, so the divorce does not take effect. In reality, however, it is—as the author said—meaningless, since such words would not be uttered by a sane person.

Al-Rawd (2) states: “Because its condition cannot be realized: tomorrow does not come during the day; rather, it comes after the day has passed.”

His statement, “If he says, ‘You are divorced in this month,’ or ‘today,’ she is divorced immediately”: If he says, “You are divorced in this month,” we say that she is divorced immediately, because the present time is part of the month. Likewise, if he says, “You are divorced today,” she is divorced immediately, because the present time is part of the day.

His statement, “If he says, ‘tomorrow,’ ‘on Saturday,’ or ‘in Ramadan,’ she is divorced at its beginning”: If he says, “You are divorced tomorrow,” “on Saturday,” or “in Ramadan,” she is divorced at its beginning, because tomorrow is realized upon the arrival of its beginning,