The correct view in this matter is that she is divorced once, even if he says, “I mean divorce by it,” because a threefold divorce only takes effect when each divorce is independent of the others.

His statement, “If he says, ‘You are to me like carrion, blood, or pork,’ whatever he intended takes effect, whether divorce, ẓihār, or an oath”: this is the third expression—when he says to his wife, “You are to me like carrion,” or “like pork,” or “like blood,” or “like a dog,” or “like a cat,” or the like of such prohibited things. If he says, “I intended divorce,” then it is divorce; if he says, “I intended ẓihār,” then it is ẓihār; and if he says, “I intended an oath,” then it is an oath.

His statement, “If he did not intend anything, then it is ẓihār”: if he says to his wife, “You are like carrion,” without intending anything, it is regarded as ẓihār, because this is an explicit expression of prohibition. The companions of the school hold that declaring one’s wife forbidden is ẓihār. We have previously explained the correct view: declaring one’s wife forbidden constitutes an oath unless it is expressed in the wording of ẓihār.

His statement, “If he says, ‘I swore by divorce,’ and he is lying”: that is, he has lied.

His statement, “Its ruling is binding upon him judicially”: when it is said that it is binding upon him judicially, this means that it is not binding upon him inwardly, in what lies between him and Allah. However, if his wife brings a case against him, it becomes binding upon him. For example, someone says to him, “Come in and have dinner,” and he replies, “I have sworn by divorce that I will not enter,” while he is lying. If she brings him before a judge, he will be held to the divorce; but if she does not bring a case against him, then nothing is due from him. Is it preferable for her to bring a case against him or to leave him? The matter requires detail: if she knows her husband to be a scrupulous and truthful man, it is forbidden for her to