is forbidden,” and “whatever” is general, encompassing everything Allah has made lawful, including one’s wife, even if he does not explicitly address her with it. This is therefore not like the first case. If it is accompanied by something indicating what he intended, we act accordingly; otherwise, we regard it as ẓihār, because the author says, “Likewise,” and the letter kāf denotes resemblance, while “this” is a demonstrative pronoun referring back to his previous statement, “You are forbidden to me.” That is, if he says, “Whatever Allah has made lawful for me is forbidden,” then it is ẓihār.
As for food, drink, and clothing, it is an oath. Thus, the ruling is divided: this expression is an oath with respect to some things and ẓihār with respect to others. The view we consider stronger is that it is an oath.
“If he says, ‘Whatever Allah has made lawful for me is forbidden—I mean divorce by it,’ she is divorced three times. If he says, ‘I mean a divorce by it,’ then it counts as one divorce. If he says, ‘You are to me like carrion, blood, and pork,’ whatever he intended takes effect, whether divorce, ẓihār, or an oath. If he did not intend anything, then it is ẓihār. If he says, ‘I swore by divorce,’ and he is lying, its ruling is binding upon him judicially, ..........................”
His statement, “If he says, ‘Whatever Allah has made lawful for me is forbidden’”: according to the stronger view, this is an oath, even if he intended his wife—unless he joins it with the words, “I mean divorce by it,” in which case she is divorced three times. This issue is less severe than the first. Thus, if he says, “Whatever Allah has made lawful for me is forbidden; I mean divorce by it,” it constitutes a threefold divorce, because he used the definite article denoting generality, rather than the generic sense—though it is possible that it could be generic. Yet they say that the basic presumption regarding the definite article is that it denotes generality. Thus, when he says, “divorce,” he means all divorce, namely three divorces.
His statement, “If he says, ‘I mean a divorce by it,’ then it is one divorce”: “a divorce” is indefinite in an affirmative context and is therefore unrestricted, since an indefinite noun in an affirmative context denotes unrestrictedness, not generality. An unrestricted expression is fulfilled by one instance. Thus, if he says, “I mean a divorce by it,” divorce takes effect, and it counts as one divorce.