Al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ - Ibn al-'Uthaymin - (13/23)

Al-Sharḥ al-MumtiʿIbn al-'Uthaymin

His statement, “and he divorces merely in compliance with his command, it does not take effect”: the pronoun in “he divorces” refers to the person under coercion. “Merely in compliance” is an expression of purpose; that is, he divorces only in compliance with the coercer’s command, not intending divorce itself. In that case, his intention in uttering the divorce is solely to ward off the coercion; he did not intend divorce, and therefore it does not take effect, due to the Prophet’s saying: “Actions are only by intentions, and every person shall have only what he intended.” (1)

Moreover, voluntary choice is a condition in all contracts and annulments. Allah, the Exalted, says: “But only in lawful trade by mutual consent.” [al-Nisa’ 4:29] Thus, all contracts and annulments must proceed from consent and free choice—unless the coercion is lawfully exercised.

It is understood from his statement, “merely in compliance with his command,” that if he divorces intending to effect the divorce, then the divorce does take effect. This is a major and weighty issue, not confined to the question of divorce; it even arises in the matter of being coerced into disbelief. Allah says: “Whoever disbelieves in Allah after having believed—except one who is compelled while his heart is secure in faith—but whoever opens his breast to disbelief, upon them is wrath from Allah, and for them is a tremendous punishment.” [al-Nahl 16:106]

So, in cases of coercion, is it stipulated that the coerced person’s intention be merely to comply with the coercer—that is, that he intends nothing but to ward off the coercion? Or do we say that coercion removes culpability from the coerced person even if he intended the act, so long as his heart is not at ease with it, because in that state the coerced person is constrained and left with no escape? The answer is:

First: if he is an ordinary layman, he cannot be expected to conceive the distinction between intending to ward off coercion and intending to effect the divorce. Therefore, there is no distinction, and he says, “This man compelled me to

(1) Its source has been cited previously on p. 17.

قوله: «فطلق تبعاً لقوله لم يقع» «طلق» الضمير يعود على المُكرَه «تبعاً» مفعول لأجله، يعني طلق متابعة لقوله لا قصداً للطلاق، فحينئذٍ يكون قصده بالطلاق دفعاً للإكراه فقط، وما نوى الطلاق، فإنه لا يقع لقول النبي ﵊: «إنما الأعمال بالنيات وإنما لكل امرئ ما نوى» (١)، ولأن الاختيار في جميع العقود والفسوخ شرط، قال الله تعالى: ﴿إِلاَّ أَنْ تَكُونَ تِجَارَةً عَنْ تَرَاضٍ مِنْكُمْ﴾ [النساء: ٢٩]، فلا بد في جميع العقود والفسوخ أن تكون صادرة عن رضاً واختيار، إلا أن يكون الإكراه بحق. وعلم من قوله: «تبعاً لقوله» أنه لو طلق بقصد إيقاع الطلاق فإنه يقع الطلاق، وهذه المسألة مسألة كبيرة عظيمة لا تختص بمسألة الطلاق، تأتي حتى في مسألة الإكراه على الكفر، قال الله تعالى: ﴿مَنْ كَفَرَ بِاللَّهِ مِنْ بَعْدِ إِيمَانِهِ إِلاَّ مَنْ أُكْرِهَ وَقَلْبُهُ مُطْمَئِنٌّ بِالإِيمَانِ وَلَكِنْ مَنْ شَرَحَ بِالْكُفْرِ صَدْرًا فَعَلَيْهِمْ غَضَبٌ مِنَ اللَّهِ وَلَهُمْ عَذَابٌ عَظِيمٌ *﴾ [النحل]، فهل يشترط في الإكراه أن يكون قصد المُكرَه متابعة المُكرِه، بمعنى أنه لا يقصد إلا دفع الإكراه، أو نقول: إن الإكراه موجب لرفع الحرج عن المُكرَه ولو نوى، ما دام قلبه لم يطمئن؛ لأن المُكرَه في تلك الحال يكون ملجأ مغلقاً عليه؟ الجواب: أولاً: لو كان عامياً، فهو ما يتصور الفرق بين أن يقصد دفع الإكراه، أو يقصد إيقاع الطلاق، فلا فرق ويقول: هذا ألزمني أن

(١) سبق تخريجه ص (١٧).