Al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ - Ibn al-'Uthaymin - (12/493)

Al-Sharḥ al-MumtiʿIbn al-'Uthaymin

does not discharge his other obligations to her. As long as the cause remains, its legal consequence must also remain. The author mentioned this because some scholars maintain that khulʿ discharges all rights that preceded it, on the grounds that its purpose is ransom and complete separation, such that neither spouse retains any tie to the other. However, the stronger view is that stated by the author: when he enters into khulʿ with her in return for something, the compensation for which he concluded the khulʿ becomes due; as for her other established rights against her husband, they remain in effect.

“If he makes her divorce contingent upon a condition, then irrevocably separates from her, and the condition occurs; then he remarries her and it occurs thereafter, she is divorced—just as in the case of manumission; otherwise, she is not.”

His statement, “If he makes her divorce contingent upon a condition, then irrevocably separates from her, and the condition occurs; then he remarries her and it occurs thereafter, she is divorced,” may be illustrated as follows: A man says, “If you speak to so-and-so, you are divorced.” After making this statement, a disagreement arises between them, so he divorces her. Her waiting period ends, and she speaks to so-and-so after it has ended. He then marries her again, and after this second marriage she speaks to so-and-so. She is divorced, because he made her divorce contingent upon a condition at a time when he had the authority to make such a contingency, and the condition upon which the divorce was contingent occurred at a time when he had the authority to divorce her. Therefore, the divorce takes effect.

If someone asks: Did not the condition occur while she was irrevocably separated from him, thereby dissolving the oath? For an oath and a contingent divorce are dissolved and come to an end upon the first occurrence.

We say: Yes, that is correct. However, the condition occurred at a time when he had no authority to divorce her, and his divorce could not take effect upon her, because she was no longer his wife. Thus, its occurrence before he married her for the second time is as though it had not occurred at all. Accordingly, she is divorced upon the second occurrence.

يسقط غيره من الحقوق؛ لأنه ما دام السبب باقياً فإنه يجب أن يبقى المُسبَّب، وإنما ذكر المؤلف ذلك؛ لأن بعض أهل العلم قال: إن الخلع يسقط ما سبقه من الحقوق؛ لأن المقصود الفداء والفراق التام، بحيث لا يبقى له علقة، ولا يبقى لها علقة، ولكن القول الراجح ما قاله المؤلف: أنه إذا خالعها بشيء وجب العوض الذي خالعها عليه، وأما غيرُه من الحقوق الواجبة لها على زوجها فهي باقية. وَإِنْ عَلَّقَ طَلَاقَهَا بِصِفَةٍ ثُمَّ أَبَانَهَا فَوُجِدَتْ، ثُمَّ نَكَحَهَا فَوُجِدَتْ بَعْدَهُ طَلَقَتْ كَعِتْقٍ، وَإِلاَّ فَلَا. قوله: «وإن علق طلاقها بصفة ثم أبانها فوُجدت، ثم نكحها فوجدت بعده طَلَقَتْ». مثال ذلك: أن يقول: إن كلمت فلاناً فأنت طالق، ثم بعد هذا الكلام طرأ بينهما سوء تفاهم فطلقها، وخرجت من العدة، وكلمت فلاناً بعد أن خرجت من العدة، ثم تزوجها ثانياً، ثم بعد الزواج الثاني كلمت فلاناً تطلق؛ لأنه علق طلاقها في حال يملك التعليق، فوجدت الصفة المعلق عليها في حال يملك التطليق، فإذاً يقع الطلاق. فإذا قال قائل: أليست الصفة وجدت في حال البينونة فانحلت اليمين بها؟ لأن اليمين والطلاق ينحلان بأول مرة وينتهيان. نقول: نعم، هذا صحيح، لكن الصفة وجدت في حال لا يملك طلاقها، ولا يقع عليها طلاقه؛ لأنها ليست في عصمته، فوجودها قبل أن يتزوجها المرة الثانية كعدمه، وعلى هذا فتطلق في المرة الثانية.