still connected to him by virtue of her waiting period—or, according to the differing view, by virtue of establishing that her womb is free of pregnancy. But it may be said: this does not mean that she is his wife. She is not his wife, even if she is still observing his waiting period.

“No condition granting the right of return is valid in it, …”

His statement, “No condition granting the right of return is valid in it,” means: in khulʿ. For example, he says, “I will grant you khulʿ, but I retain the right to take you back after the khulʿ: I will return the compensation to you and take you back.” It has already been explained that when a man grants his wife khulʿ and receives the compensation from her, saying, “I grant you khulʿ in return for this compensation,” the marital bond between them is severed, because this is a redemption. Thus, he cannot take her back except through a new marriage contract and with her consent.

For example, he grants her khulʿ for one thousand riyals, and she hands it over to him. He says, “I grant you khulʿ in return for this thousand,” but stipulates, “If I later decide to take you back, I will return the compensation and take you back.” The author says that this condition granting a right of return is invalid.

A question arises here: Why is the khulʿ valid while the condition is void?

They say: the condition is void because it conflicts with the purpose of khulʿ, for the purpose of khulʿ is for the wife to free herself from this husband. If he stipulates that he has the right to take her back, this purpose is lost to the wife.

The khulʿ is valid because this condition does not pertain to the essence of the contract: it entails neither uncertainty nor the commission of anything prohibited. At most, it is an invalid condition that is disregarded, just as the Prophet ﷺ annulled the condition imposed by the family of Barīrah that the right of patronage should belong to them, while upholding the contract (1),